occurs when ultimately negative knowledge passes as positive knowledge in some evidential context. In the experimentalist's idiom, error is an artifact interpreted as a signal, or fact. How does one differentiate fact from error, since both seem justified, while only one is true? I am primarily interested here in how false claims can masquerade as (locally) justified.
Some confuse error with uncertainty. For example, scientists refer to measurement error and statistically derived standard error. Their graphs often include error bars. These all denote a range of numerical values, within which the actual value remains uncertain-that is, indefinite or unknown. No error (in the sense just noted) is identified. None may exist. Uncertainty, here, only marks the scope of potential error associated with a benchmark value. Uncertainty itself (as a form of indeterminacy or ambiguity) is not error. How error and uncertainty do relate is an important theme addressed below ( §4).
Claims of error and negative knowledge, I contend, involve the same forms of justification used for positive knowledge ( § §2-3 below). Identifying an experimental artifact involves constructing another, alternative fact built in part on the same evidence. To ensure reliability, one must address residual uncertainty by explicitly considering the potential evidence for such alternatives. Even in the absence of anomalies or better explanations, one must probe for error. Resolving fact and error through such further work yields deep reliability ( §4). Indeed, I claim, knowledge develops by resolving such uncertainties in successive layers. The significance of the epistemic work in ascertaining error and resolving uncertainty guides a program in error analytics, which frames many new challenges for philosophers of science ( §5).
Do We See Mesosomes with a Microscope?
Consider the case of bacterial mesosomes (Rasmussen 1993 , Culp 1994 , Hudson 1999 , cited below without dates). Mesosomes are structures detected through electron microscopy, first observed in 1953. Biochemists and bacteriologists searched for their function for over a decade. Microscopists now generally construe them as artifacts, irrelevant products of preparing specimens, not genuine, or "real," structures in bacteria-that is, as error. Why were mesosomes first viewed as fact and later as artifact? This episode helps profile the construction of error and the role of the fact/artifact distinction (Latour and Woolgar 1979 , Hacking 1984 , Galison 1987 , Franklin 1996 .
Mesosomes were not predicted by any theory. One cannot simply dismiss them as theoryladen observations. They just appeared in electron micrographs. Microscopists certainly knew that they could misinterpret such images. So they calibrated the electron microscope against light microscopes, aware that finer resolution might nonetheless reveal new structures and discrepancies (such as mesosomes). They varied the preparation procedure to see if the phenomenon was robust. It appeared to be. Not that mesosomes were not contingent upon preparation technique. Any new phenomenon needs to be "teased into relief" (as Galison notes).
Microscopists gradually developed optimal conditions for revealing mesosomes, exploring the presence of sucrose, glycerol or calcium ions, pre-fix time, temperature, form of cryoprotection, fixative and method of viewing (e.g., thin section v. freeze-fracture) (see Hudson, [306] [307] .
They developed a body of experimental knowledge for producing mesosomes reliably. At this level, mesosomes were-and still are-"real." They are wholly reproducible. The conditions for their existence are well characterized: features we do not conventionally associate with error. A stable phenomenon, one might note, need not be meaningful.
In the early 1960s, scientists regarded mesosomes as authentic bacterial structures.
Enough so, at least, that biochemists began analyzing their function (Rasmussen, (245) (246) (247) (248) (249) (250) Culp, 48) . Textbooks featured pictures and diagrams of the prominent mesosomes, noting their role
was not yet known. Evidence during this period seemed to warrant acceptance, even if tentative or qualified (a critical historical point missing in Hudson's analysis). How, then, did anyone ever suspect otherwise: that mesosomes were not "real"? Why open the mesosome black box?
Reservations emerged in several labs beginning in the late 1960s and early 70s. Nanne Nanninga had been checking the relatively new freeze-etch (now freeze-fracture) technique.
Problems with another structure, the nucleoplasm, arose and were resolved using phase-contrast light microscopy on living cells (Nanninga 1971, 222-23) . But for mesosomes, discrepancies between old and new technique persisted. Nanninga (1971) isolated one difference to the use of osmium tetroxide (OsO 4 ) as a prefixative. But here (she acknowledged) the intepretation of mesosomes was coupled to an evaluation of the methods that produced them. With no independent standard available, one could only withhold judgment (pp. 222-23). M. Silva (1971) echoed her concerns, especially about OsO 4 . Citing inconsistencies from different methods he, too, adopted a new posture of indeterminacy. But he argued for this position, appealing to visible differences as evidence. Both investigators began dislodging anchors that established the meaning of the structure in the micrographs. The anomaly of mesosomes emerged, then, during normal science (Kuhn 1972) . But the mismatch did not involve theory. Rather, alternate methods generated discordant observations: a consilience anomaly.
An anomaly, though, is not a full-fledged error. Interpreting an anomaly requires further experimental work and reasoning. An anomaly signals only the presence of an error. Until it is fully characterized (by isolating it in the procedural-conceptual network), the error is unknown.
Confidently accepting mesosomes as artifacts, therefore, involved understanding how they were created. One needed to explain mesosomes. One also needed experimental data to justify that interpretation.
Such explanatory models of mesosomes emerged in the mid-1970s. Nanninga (1973) hypothesized an enlargement of small membrane features due to "chemical or physical impairment" (pp. 171-74), though withotu offering any detailed mechanism. She cited relevant information, such as the shape of mesosomes, their placement and the failure of anyone over more than a decade to identify a clear function. M. Higgins' lab based their scheme on the ability (independently demonstrated) of one fixative, glutaraldehyde, to cross-link proteins, proposing that it caused small, peripheral membrane units to coalesce into one, oversized mesosome (Higgins et al 1976) . Margrit Fooke-Acheterrath and her group (1974) again linked large mesosomes to OsO 4 , and showed that chilling could prevent this, but admitted that "the precise mechanism by which the artifacts arise is unknown" (p. 282). All these researchers targeted large mesosomes only. Silva's lab (1976) , however, assembled a more comprehensive and thorough model, richly argued with comparisons and controls. First, they showed that use of OsO 4 was correlated temporally with progressive mesosome formation (in both number and size). One could virtually track their development. Further, they proposed a mechanism. OsO 4 damaged membranes, they said. This was observed when they "calibrated" OsO 4 using simple protoplasts (without cell walls). They also measured potassium ion efflux as an indicator of membrane damage, independently of any microscopy. They also considered other chemicals, showing that only those that damaged membranes (not just OsO 4 ) generated mesosomes. Silva's paper established new standards for interpreting mesosomes. Debate and elaboration followed for at least a decade (Hudson, (301) (302) (303) (304) , but the ultimate resolution resembled Silva's 1976 sketch: mesosomes are "real," but they are produced only when the bacterial membrane is damaged in preparing cells for electron microscopy. They are not native in the cells. The error, in a sense, was complete. With Silva's results, the robustness of earlier assessments of mesosomes dissolved. That is, all the previously "diverse," apparently independent experimental methods now collapsed into one common flaw: membrane damage. Different controlled experiments confirmed how this variable was critical. Silva had anchored mesosomes to new benchmarks on a different experimental landscape. They became artifacts: they no longer reflected authentic cell structures. Mesosomes were (are) still fact, though uninteresting or irrelevant. Of course, these new arguments have their own limits, or qualifications. Mesosomes seem to occur at specific locations. Thus, the pattern of how membranes respond to damage may indicate something (else) about bacterial cell structure.
In summary, do we (did we) see mesosomes with the electron microscope? Using Hacking's (1984) principles, one might say "yes" and "no." Clearly, microscopists identified a "real" phenomenon, separating signal from noise in the spirit of the New Experimentalists. And it was stable, as emphasized by many sociologists (Latour and Woolgar 1979, Pickering 1995) .
At the same time, Hacking insisted, the mapping from specimen to observed image must be good (p. 320). The mapping ultimately determines the meaning of the image. In this case, mesosomes
were not good mappings of living cells. Knowing this, however, involved justifying that they are, instead, good mappings of damaged cell membranes. They are now different facts: about how bacterial cells respond to OsO 4 and other treatments. We now see mesosomes as error.
What Causes Beriberi?
The mesosome case represents experimental, or relatively local, error. Error may also be more conceptual, or global. Consider the case of the cause of beriberi (Carpenter 2000) . We now view beriberi as a dietary deficiency of thiamine, or Vitamin B 1 . But Christiaan Eijkman in 1886 guided his studies using the recently developed germ theory of disease. He began looking for a microbe that caused beriberi. Indeed, the patterns of outbreaks-on ships, in prisons, insane assylums and impoverished neighborhoods-strongly indicated contagion through lack of hygiene. Through a series of accidents Eijkman isolated the cause of a similar disease in chickens to a diet of polished white rice. The polishings, or red coating of the rice, would cure the disease. Eijkman claimed to have localized the bacterium in the rice, along with an anti-toxin in the coating. To extrapolate his findings to humans, Eijkman and a local official surveyed the incidence of beriberi among the prisons on Java. They identifyied diets as either polished rice, unpolished rice, or a mixture. The scale of the controlled study was immense: 280,000 prisoners in 100 sites. They also considered and ruled out ("controlled for") other factors that might be microbial vectors: ventilation, age of buildings, permeability of the floors to water, etc. The data dramatically confirmed Eijkman's claims.
When institutions later changed their rice diets, the incidence of beriberi decreased. This study capped the work that later earned Eijkman a Nobel Prize. Though Eijkman's conclusions fit the evidence, they were not necessarily free from error.
Other interpretations, outside Eijkman's conceptual horizon, were also possible. Eijkman's successor in Java, Gerrit Grijns, saw the reverse gestalt: namely, something missing rather than something present. He saw the rice coating as containing an essential nutrient. When absent, patients succumbed to beriberi. For him, there was no germ or infection. Contrary explanations, here, each fit the available evidence. Uncertainty resurfaced. Further experimental work was needed. Grijns thus explored the contrast cases. He showed that the nutrient, as a "curative" factor, might be found in other foods, notably the mongo bean, kachang-ijo. Likewise, non-rice diets of tapioca root or sago might also cause the disease. Grijns created anomalies for the bacterial hypothesis, all aligned with his own interpretation. Contextualizing Eijkman's findings (3) Reproducibility alone does not establish meaningful fact.
Mesosomes are perfectly reproducible, even today. We know how to produce "good" mesosomes in contrast to "poor" mesosomes. Interpreting them is a distinct process. So, too, can one use an erroneous bacterial model to cause beriberi with rice diet. As Walter Gilbert once cautioned, "you can reproduce artifacts very, very well" (Judson 1981, 170 ).
Mere replication (or lack thereof) differs from interpreting experimental results (contra Collins 1985, 19, 130) . One needs some other method to circumvent error. Experimental conclusions that survive rigorous error probes, Mayo says, pass a severe test (1996, 64, . That is, one argues from error, in the sense that one considers specific An error analytic view invites philosophers to articulate more fully the dynamics of learning from error. What strategies allows researchers to isolate, identify and remedy error, once an anomaly is encountered (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Darden 1990; 1991, Chaps. 8, 11, 15) ? How do researchers use knowledge of error? For example, researchers typically develop an informal catalog of past mistakes: an error repertoire (Mayo 1996, 5, 18 (Mayo 1996, 18, 316, 453) . Because errors may be social, as well as experimental, error analytics can potentially unify philosophical and sociological perspectives. I interpret these problems as invigorating a philosophy of science caught between the New Experimentalism and unresolved issues of reliability, and challenged by sociological cases of error. Well construed, an inquiry into the epistemology of error therefore not only highlights the resolved/uncertain distinction and deep reliability, but also may launch a new research programme to guide philosophy of science into a new century.
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Notes
1 The concept of deep reliability echoes Harding's (1991) notion of strong objectivity.
Both preserve conventional concepts of justification, going beyond them by articulating remedies to specific weaknesses. The gender and ethnic bias that is central to Harding's account is just one form of error (emerging at the social level) in a more general error analytic perspective.
2 On experimental design see Rudge (1998) on Kettlewell's peppered moths, Galison (1987, 64) on the Barnett effect, Franklin (1986, 138-64 ) on Millikan's oil drops, Mayo (1996, 214-50) on Perrin's Brownian motion; on arguments, see Suppe (1998, 393) on the role of data
